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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

court held that an injunction would not serve the public interest. As a
result, the court denied the Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
Merc Pittinos
United States Pub. Interest Research Group v. Heritage Salmon, Inc.,
No. 00-150-B-C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13283 (D. Me. Aug. 28, 2001)
(holding associations asserting rights on behalf of members may
establish standing where the individual members meet basic elements
of standing).
In 2000, United States Public Interest Group ("USPIRG") filed a
citizen's suit accusing Heritage Salmon, Inc. ("Heritage"), a salmon
farm located in the vicinity of Cobscook Bay ("Bay"), Maine, of
violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), and failing to obtain an
NPDES permit. USPIRG sought a declaratory judgment that Heritage
was in violation of an effluent standard or limitation under Chapter
26, Title 33 U.S.C. In addition, they sought civil penalties and an
order enjoining Heritage from continuing to violate the applicable
standard or limitation. In response to USPIRG's accusations, Heritage
filed a motion to dismiss under the theory that USPIRG had failed to
establish standing.
When the plaintiff is an association asserting rights on behalf of its
members: (1) some members must have standing to sue in their own
right; (2) the members' interest in the suit must be germane to the
organization's purpose; and (3) the claim asserted and the relief
requested must not require the individual participation of those
members in the suit. Heritage conceded that USPIRG satisfied the
second and third requirements, but argued USPIRG was unable to
satisfy the first requirement. USPIRG claimed standing based on the
experiences of three members who stated they were adversely affected
by Heritage's pollution of the Bay and its tributaries. The members
each claimed they reduced or eliminated the amount of fish they
consumed from the Bay or its tributaries because they were fearful of
the effects of the pollution on the fish. Two of the members stated
they stopped fishing in the area because of the pollutants in the water
from Heritage, and feared the further depletion of wild salmon, which
were already suffering from Heritage's pollution.
The United States District Court for the District of Maine held
USPIRG had established standing because the members had suffered
injuries in fact traceable to the defendant's activities, which were
redressable through court action. Injury in fact was established, inter
alia, because the members were not taking advantage of a "local food
source that they would otherwise enjoy due, in large measure, to
Heritage's discharges." The court also emphasized that environmental
plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact "when they aver that they use
the affected area and are persons for whom the aesthetic and
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recreational values of the area will be lessened by the challenged
activity."
For an injury to be "fairly traceable" to the defendant, the court
analyzed whether Heritage's pollutants caused or contributed to the
kinds of injuries alleged by USPIRG. The court asserted Heritage
could not defeat the plaintiffs' claims of standing "simply by arguing
other causative agents may be operating to bring about the decline of
wild salmon stocks."
Finally, the court stated that to satisfy the redressability
requirement, the plaintiffs' attestations must reveal a "substantial
likelihood" the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury. The
court decided that an order enjoining unlicensed discharges from
Heritage's operations and/or penalizing Heritage for ongoing
violation of the CWA would provide a meaningful remedy for the
injuries. Therefore, the District Court decided USPIRG had standing
to bring a citizen's suit against Heritage for violations of the CWA.
Sarah A. Hubbard
Le-Ax Water Dist. v. City of Athens, 174 F. Supp. 2d 696 (S.D. Ohio
2001) (granting Le-Ax Water District's motions for summary judgment
and declaratory judgment, and holding that City of Athens' agreement
to provide water service to proposed development violated Le-Ax's
protection under 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b)).
Le-Ax Water District ("Le-Ax") sued the City of Athens ("City") for
arranging to supply water to a new development by University Estates,
Inc. ("UE"), asserting such an arrangement violated 7 U.S.C. §
1926(b), which serves to protect the rights of rural water districts in an
effort to promote rural expansion. The City claimed, since the new
development did not fall within Le-Ax's current boundaries as defined
by the state, Le-Ax could not assert a right to service the development.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
Le-Ax developed as a regional, rural water district with the help of
loans from the Rural Economic and Community Development Service
("RECDS"). Le-Ax pledged all its water service revenues to secure the
debt. According to a surveyor hired by the City, Le-Ax's boundaries
fell approximately 1400 feet short of the proposed UE development
site, a point the City emphasized at trial. Nonetheless, Le-Ax's water
lines ran close to the site, while the City would have had to create
additional water access in order to serve UE. These facts allowed both
parties to make arguments that § 1926(b) spoke in their favor.
The portion of § 1926(b) upon which Le-Ax relied stated, "the
service provided or made available" by a regional water district shall
not be limited by any "municipal corporation or other public body"
within which the regional district lies. The court allowed protection
under § 1926(b) upon the satisfaction of three elements: (1) the

